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FACTUAL AND COGNITIVE PROBABILITY
*Rolando Chuaqui
AB STRACT. The paper presents a modification of the definition
of probability presented in earlier papers of the author (e.g.
A semant i.cal: definition of probabi l i tu , in Non-Classical Logics,
Model Theory and Computability, North Holland, pp.135-167).
This modification separates the two aspects of probability:
probability as a part of physical theories (factual), and as a
basis for statistical inference (cognitive). Factual probabil-
ity is represented by probability structures as in the earlier
papers, but now built independently of the language. Cognitive
probability is interpreted as a form of "partial truth". The
paper also contains a discussion of the Principle of Insuffi-
cient Reason and of Bayesian and classical statistical methods,
in the light of the new definition.
111ispaper presents a rrodifi.cat ion of the semantical definition of probabil-
ity introduced in Chuaqui 1977 and 1980. The new definition presented here
brings forth the two aspects of probability: as a basis for statistical infer-
ence and as a part of physical theories.
The main modification introduced is making independert of the language the
defini tion of the group of transformations that preserve the laws of the phe-
nonenon, Thus, the determination of the probability measure for the simple
probability structures of Chuaqui 1977 becomes independentof linguistic eIe-
nerits , and the simple probability interpretations <)(,8,11> of Chuaqui 1980 may
be considered as models of reality.
The connection with cognitive elements is established via the concept of
probability as degree of partial truth, introduced in earlier papers.
The first section analyzes the different uses of probability, while in the
second, I give a brief account and a classification of theories on probability.
Section 3 introduces the modification of the definition in Chuaqui 1977 and
1980 that pennits to consider probability structures as models of reality.
* This work was partially supported by the Organization of American States
through its Regional Scientific and Technological Development Program.
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'[he fourth section justifies the cognitive uses of probability by considering it
as a Iogical concept, whi le the fifth applies these remarks to an analysis of the
Pr-inai.p l» or Tnnu j fi.ci ent: Reaeon . 111elast section complements the study in
Chuaqui 1980 of cl ass ical and Bayesian s tati s t ica 1 methods.
r would like to thank Professor William Reinhardt, Newton C.A.da Costa, and
lcopo ldo Bertossi for many useful connnents.
1. USES OF PROBABILITY.
['rohabil i ty is used as a basis for stn tist i cal inference and as a part of
sc ienti fic theories. In its firs t use, I shall distinguish two different appli-
c.it ions . One appl icut ion is to use probability as the very guide of life in the
Lice 0 [ unccr ta int.y . 111us , probability is the basis of decision theory in its
c l.is s ica l and Bayesian Iorms. The need for statistical Infe rence arises from our
uncortni nty CIS to howwo ought to behave under ci rcunst ances where we are igno-
r.in t concerning the state of the world. As Kyburg 1974 says, "we attempt to de-
velop rules of behavior which we may follow, whatever the state of the world,
in the cxpcc t a t ion that we are following rules whose characteristics are' gener-
:111v (I) dcs i rublo , ,1I1d(2) attainable". The most desirable rule is one tha t
te [I s us how to discover the true state of the world; the most attainable and
simplest is to forget about the arithmetic and act as we feel like it. A compro-
misc between these two cxt rcmes is to fol Iow what we may know about the probabil-
ities or the different possible states of the world, i.e. about a measure of the
degree of truth of each possible state of the world.
lhc second appLi ca t ion of statistical inference is the evaluation of scien-
tific hypothc sc s , '111isappl icat ion can be thought of as a case of a decision
"he the r to accept or not a scientific hypothes i s , and thus it can be assimilated
to processes of the firs t kind. However , I believe with R.A. Fischer that ", ..
such processes have a logical basis very different from those of a scientist en-
g:lgcd in g'linin~ from his observations an improved understading of reality".
(fi shc r 195() p.5).
Bcsidcs these statistical uses, probability statements appear as part of
physical theories such as Statistical ivechanics or QuantumfVlechanics, Also, most
of the theory of stochastic processes serves as basis for scientific theories of
p.rrt.i culu r phenomena, such as Brownian motion and radioactive decay.
Although the word "probab i l i ty" itself might not occur in a sientific theo-
ry, probability concepts arc present as general statements expressing stochastic
rc lat ions .unong random quanr i t ies . For instance, there may be functions express-
ing cli s t r ibut ions or densities of certain quanti ties under certain circumstances.
.uiywav, probubiLi tics of events a re obtained from them and used in applications.
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Intuitively, there are other evidences of probabilities as independent of
our knowledge or belief. For instance, if we toss a coin 100 times and in 60 obtain
"heads", it seems natural to believe that this is a property of the coin or rath-
er of the coin together with the mechanism for tossing it.
Since the statistical applications stem from our ignorance of the true state
of the world, I shall call them cognitive uses. On the other hand, the other
uses will be the factual uses.
2. COGNITIVE VERSUS FACTUAL INTERPRETATIONS.
The interpretations of the concept of probability which have been offered
stress either the cognitive or the factual uses of probability. Amongthe first,
I would put the subjectivist and logical views. Amongthe second, the frequent-
ist and propensity views. The subjectivist do not attempt to explain howwe get
our probabilities while the hOlders of the logical views do. On the other side,
the propensity theories do not atten~t to define probabilities but only to mea-
sure them, while the frequentists build models of reality where probability is
defined in terms of other concepts.
Probability, however, has both cognitive and factual aspects. Thus, any in-
terpretation should give an account of both. In order to do this, many scholars
hold a dual view: there is an interpretation of probability as degree of belief
or credence (cognitive) and another as chance or propensity (factual). The con-
nection between the two should be given by a principle of the following form (a
similar principle was formulated in Lewis 1980): let X be the proposition that
the chance, at time t, of A holding equals x, where x is a real rumber of the
mit interval. Let Cx be any reasonable "degree of belief" function of a person
that believes X at time t . Then Cx(A) = x.
In this principle, X is supposed to contain the statement about the factual
probability of A. Cx(A) is the cognitive probability of A. The two are supposed
to be connected by the principle.
I believe that any interpretation of probability should explain both the
factual and cognitive uses of probability and justify a principle such as the one
above. I shall attempt to provide such an account by modifying the views espoused
in Chuaqui 1977 and 1980.
3. PROBABILITY STRUCTURES AS MODELS OF CHANCE.
3.1. Simple probability models. In Chuaqui 1977, the theory of simple
probability structures was presented. From the simple probability structures K,
there were obtained probability interpretations of languages, constituted by
triples <K,B,~>, where B is a field of subsets of K and ~ a probability measure.
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Wewant to consider these probability structures as models of reality which de-
termine the probability measure u, However, in myoriginal presentation, the def-
inition of ]1 depended heavily on the language used. I believe this to be a fea-
ture that precludes their use as models of reality. I shall now offer a modifi-
cation of the concept of simple probability structures that wi l I give us a def-
ini tion of ]1, independent of the language.
There are two elements in <K,B,]1> that are language dependent in Chuaqui
1977. The first is the definition of B as the field of sets generated by all the
sets MbdK(¢) where ¢ is a sentence of the appropriate language (recall that
Mod
K
(¢) is the set of models of K in whi.ch ¢ holds). However, B is the algebra
of events and there is no need of choosing it in this way, it can be taken to be
just the algebra of events that are necessary for an adequate description of the
situation. In case K is finite for instance, B will generally be the power set
of K. Amore detailed explanation of B will be given in Section 4.
Jhe other linguistic element is the definition of the group GX' namely condi-
tions (1) (a) and (l)(b). This we have to get rid of.
In order to make the situation clear, I shall begin with the same example as
in Chuaqui 1977, the choosing of a sample S of size m from a finite population
of balls P. Whenwe say "S has n red balls" we mean that one of the properties
of the outcome was that the sample had n red balls. The same outcome has many
di ffc rerrt properties. Wecan think of an ideal approximation of an outcome,name-
ly a relational system that represents a possible model of the situation invol-
ved. In the case we are looking at, we can schematize the possible outcomes as
systems as = <P,RO, ... ,Rm_1,S>, where P is the finite set of balls, RO, .. ,Rm_1
are fixed subsets of P that represent the properties we are interested in (for
instance, red), and S is any subset of P of m members (the sample). For 'each
subset S of m rrembers there is a corresponding system Ol. S; the set of possible
outcomes 1(, consist of all models Ol: S of the form described above.
Let us analyze a possible out.cone a.S = <P,RO" •. ,Rm_1 ,S>. The properties
RO"" ,Rm-1 are intrinsic properties of the balls in P. That is, when we move
the balls around or choose a sample, their properties remain. Also, these prop-
erties are fixed in all aLS' Wemay thus call <P,RO, ••• ,Rm_1> the intrinsic part
oj' X. ()1 the other hand, <P,S> gi es the structure of the cxperi ment, and is var-
iable in each (Jls. <P,S> is called the structural part of (JlS and denoted
(Jls,ct. Wemay have different experiments perfonred on the same set of balls P.
The probability structures for these different experurent s might have the same
int rins ic part but different structure. For instance, if the experiment con-
sists of the choosing of a sample with two RO~balls, the outcome will be of the
fonn <P,RO, ... ,Rm_1,Q> where Q is a subset of P with two RO-balls.
The second example I shall give is a modification of Example 3 of Chuaqui
1977. Suppose we have a circular roulette with a point for each real number.
47
For simplicity, a fixed force is applied but the roulette starts from a variable
position. Each outcome results from beginning at a particular position. The sys-
tems in Ie maybe taken to be of the form
ol. = <C,r,f,I>
I
where C is the set of points in the circle, r reprBsents translations in the cir-
cle (a ternary operation, r(a,b,c) is c rotated by the angle from a to b), f is
the continuous unary function that associates each initial position with a final
position, and I is the set containing the initial position (I contains one ele-
ment of C). Here, <C,f> constitutes the intrinsic part of Ie, because it is an in-
trinsic property of each point x in C that it yield a final position f(x). With
this f we can express the asymmetryof the roulette, if it is asymmetric. Wecan
node l symmetric roulettes without this f. The s t ructure of the experiment is giv-
en by <C,r,I>. I is variable in the different (J[ I' Howeverl' is fixed. Thus, we
cannot distinguish between the intrinsic part and the structure by just looking
at the variable part of Ie. Notice that C is not enough for defining a circle. It
is necessary to add an operation between the elements of C. For instance, I have
chosen in this paper r-, 'This operation r should be part of the structure of the
experiment, because it really consists of a rotation of the circle.--If we had
just <C,I> in the structure, the expe r.irrent would be the choosing of a point in
a set C and not in a circle <c ,»>,
From these two examples, we see that in order to describe the simple prob-
abili ty structure we need to specify, besides the class of possible outcomes K,
its intrinsic part. Thus, we define a simple probability structure as a pair
K = <K,a>where IC is a set of relational structures of a fixed similarity type
(called t.he set of outcomes of K) and (fI- is a relational s tructure (called t.he
intrinsic part of K) such that z]J = (J[ for every Lc K, where J IS the index set
of the s imi Iar.i ty type of (Jf; (thus, all st.ructure :f.-e::K, have the same universe
say A) ,
The group of functions GK i nowdetermined by K and B without reference to
the language. For 1.-E K, let t..st = 1.t (I-J) wh re I is the index set of the sim-
ilari ty type of K. That , is t-strepresents the structure of the exper inent . Also,
for B,=, K, Est = {i.st : ;t.c B}.
The group of funct icns GK that preserve the "laws of the phenomenon" contains
all permut~tjons f of the universe A such that
* -1*(1) For any i.e:: K, f (f...st) e:: Kst and f (Lst) e:: Kst
(2) For any B £: B, Bf e:: Band Br1 e::B,.,here Bf is the unique C s.: K such
t at C =, Jt*i.;t..e B }st l st '
Condit ion (I) can be expressed simply by Kf,- K a'1dKf-1 e:.:K.The measure u is a,
measure invariant under G.lC
In our first exampIe GK consists of all rmutations of the universe P. In
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the second, C
K
contains all autono rphi srrs of <C,r>. In general, if <A,PO'" ,Pn-1>
is const~lt in all elements of K and none of the relations PO' ""Pn-1 are in
the in trinsic part of K then G is a subgroup of the automorphisms of, K 0
<A,PO"" ,Pn-1>·
In order to extend the situation to compoundstructures, we define a sym-
metry relation between subsets A, B of K:
A _ B iff tf = B for a certain f E CK"
K
The measure ]J is now invariant under -K' i.e.Aj(B implies ]J(A) = ]J(B).
Surnmarizing,we have obtained a model of reality <K,B> that gives a probabil-
ity measure ]J invariant under GK. If this ]Jwere the unique invariant measure,
then <K,B> would be a sufficient description of the model. Uniqueness is not a
rare phenomenon. As a matter of fact, all situations I have analyzed yield a
un ique measure. However, the general conditions for uniqueness that I know of
are rather technical and, hence, they are not natural to add as requirements for
<I(,B>. Thus, the simple probability models have to be specifed by the triple
J = <K,B,]J> where K = <.K,a> is a simple probability structure, B a a-algebra
of suhsets of K, and ]J a probability measure invariant under GK; K is called
the set of outcomes of J.
3.2. Compound probability models.
introduced in Chuaqui 1980 need only minor
However , it may be noted that with the
The compoundprobability structures
modifications.
new definition of simple probability
structures, the compound structures seem muchmore natural, since now the sym-
rretries are independent of the language.
An outline of the definition of compoundprobability structure will help t"a
unders tand the situation. These structures are determined by three elements.
1. The causal structure. The basic elements of the causal structure are
the (causal) trees <T,~.T>' T is a set and <T is a well founded partial ordering
on T such that the successors of any t E T are countable and well ordered by <T'
f\ graphical representation of an example of a tree is:
e--e--e--e--e
where ~T is in the horizontal irection from left to right.
A tree is a general i zation of the noti n of causal depe dence. TITUS, what
happens 'lt t ET influences what :lappens at a succcding s , i.e. at sT ~t. If
-IJ 1IDdt are not related by <T' then they are independent moments. The elements
of T can be considered tn 1110s-t .cases as time moments, but this is not necessar-
ily so.
A causal structure F consists of a family of trees that. -incIudes all its
subtrees. «T '-<T> is a subtree of <5'<5> if <T c:: <5' and t e: T, Be: 5 and B <s.t
imply Be: T.) In most cases, it is enough to consider all the subtrees of a grv-
en tree <T'<T>'
2. The set of outcomes. The outcomes are functions f with domain a cer-
tain Te: F. For any t e: T, f(t) is what happens at t, and is a memberof the
set of outcomes H(f,t) of a simple probability structure H(f,t). This simple
probability model is determined by the preceding values of f, i .e . f restricted
to Tt = {s :S <T t and B of t}. Calling HT the set of all outcomes with domain T,
the events are subsets of HT for T e: F. In fact, H(f,t) = {j(t): j e: HT and
jfTt = ffTt} is the sure event determined by frTt, i .e . the set of outcomes
that are possible if flTt has occurred.
3. The symmetry relation. On each simple probability model H(f,t) we co-
tain a symmetry relation t,t as explained above. From these relations, the sym-
metry relation - between compoundevents is obtained. Since now t,t is indepen-
dent of the language, - will also be. The relation - is defined in several
stages.
a) Wefirst define isomorphism between two simple probability models
J = «I,Ol > ,H, u> and JI = «K' .d '>, H: u ' >. Suppose A and A I are the universes
of I .and I' respectively.
J ~ J' if and only if g is a one to one function from A onto Af satisfy-
g
ing:
(i) If. = Kg (i.e. K~t {g*;e.::!..<>= Ist})'
(ii) For any B e: H, Bg e: H'.
(iii) For any Be: H, ].l(B) = u ' (Bg) .
In case ].l is the unique £1<-invariant measure, condition (iii) is implied by the
other two, since then Il' is also the unique £1<,-invariant measure. This is so
because the groups GK and GK, are related by the isomorphism g as follows:
-1f e: £1<iff e-r-e EO GI'
Let B e: H, C e: H', then
B '" C iff J = J' and Bg 'V'C.
g g "
This definition of isomorphism constitutes the only difference with the defini-
tion in chwqui 1980, Section 5, of compoundprobability structures. Wecould
use the same definition as there, but I believe that the new one is an improve-
so
rrerit of the fonner; in particular because
J "'g J (i.e. with J' = J) iff g EO GK•
b) Wenow introduce the notion of isomorphism between sets HT and HT, for
T, T' c F. These isomorphisms are pairs of functions «hJ:» such that h is an
isomorphism between <T, ~T> and <T' '~T'>' and k is a one to one function from
HT onto /-IT' with the following properties.
(i) If t E: T, f, f' E: HT and frTt = f" rTt (i.e. what occurs before t is the
same for f as for ;'), then k(f)rT\(t) = k(f')rT'h(t) (i .e . what occurs
before h(t) c T' is the same for kef) as for k(f')).
(ii) H(f,t) and H(k(f) ,h(t)) are isomorphic (in the sense of (a)) for
f cl1T and t cT. In fact, the corresponding isomorphism gf,t is such that
if L = jet) for a certain j c HT with jrTt = frTt, then gJ,t£.st = (k(j)
(h(t)))st' Notice that jet) is an outcome in H(f,t) and k(j) (h(t)), an out-
cone in H(k(f) ,h(t)).
c) Nowlet As HT and B S HT, for T, T' c F. Wesay that A - B .iff there is
an isomorphism h of <T'''T> onto <T', ~T'> and there are S, S' and k such that,
(i) <S,"'S> is a subtree of <T'~T> and S' = h*S.
(ii) HS is isomorphic to HS' by <hrS,k>.
(iii) For every t E: S and f EO Hs the corresponding parts of A and B by
<h,k> are equivalent, i.e. if we define A(f,t) = {jet): j cA and jrTt
frTt} then A(f,t) :::gr,tB(k(f),h(t)).
(iv) For tcT-S and fc BT, AU,t) is equivalent to the sure event at its
level, i.e. A(f,t)-f,tH(f,t).
(v) Similarly, for t' E: T'-S' and f' E: HT" B(f' ,t')-f't,H(f' ,t').
The measure u on the compoundevents should be invariant under -c , In Chua-
qui 1980, a procedure for defining such a measure is given. The algebra of corne
pound events consists just of the measurable sets with respect to this measure.
lis a first example of a compoundprobability structure, I shall take the
case of independent trials of the same experiment. Assume that the experiment
is modeled by a simple probability model J = <K ,B, ~> and that there are n inde-
pendent trials where n " w. Weassume a symmetry relation is defined on J, say
The causal structure for the compoundmodel is constituted by the subtrees
of <n, = >. Since the trials are independent, there is no causal relation be-
tween them; thus , we take = for the partial ordering.
111ecompound set of out corres is 1"1<, where K = «,m >. For every f c nX
and ten, BU,t) = J. Since <n> is a very simple tree, all <m, => with m s n
5'
are subtrees. Also, the only condition for the isomorphism of two such subtrees
is that they have the same cardinality, and any isomorphism can be extended to
an automorphism of <n, = > , i ;e . a pennutation of n.
Events are subsets of "m = "K for m ~ n . For any A ~ Am' f e:: H and t e:: m
A(f,t) = {jet): j e:: A}; thus A(f,t) is independent of f and "(f,t) = K.
Suppose that Hm and Hm, are given and that h is a one to one function from
m onto m'. Let us analyze which k are such that <h,k> is an isomorphism of Hm
onto "m" k should be a one to one function from"m onto l\n .. Since for every
t e:: m, Tt = 0, condition b(i) is always satisfied. Condition b(ii) requires
that there be an isomorphisTIlgt of J onto itself (i.e. gt E GK) such that
g;(j(t)st) = (k(j) (h(t)))st for every j E Hmo Thus, if B ~"m and C ~ Am' then
B - C iff BCf,t)-xBCf,h(t)) for every t e:: m,
Therefore, the compoundmeasure is given by the product measure, and the
compoundevents are the measurable sets according to this product measure.
As a second example, take T = {to,t,}, a set of two elements, with tO~T t"
and its subtrees, as F. For to' we have the simple probability model JO =
«KO,lno>,BO,lJO>' For each t...e:: KO' we have the simple probability model JL =
«Kt., In> ,B,t, lJ,f? The compoundoutcones are the functions f with DOf = T and such
that f(tO) e:: KO and f(to) e:: Kf(to)' Suppose, further, that Ki.- is not isomorphic
to Kt..." for J.. f- J..' .
The only subtree of <T'~T> is <{to}'~T>' There is only one automorphism of
<T'''''T>'namely the identity.
It is clear that H(f,tO) = JO and HCf,t,) = Jf(to) for every outcome f. Let
us see wh ich are the k's for which the pair <identity, k> is an isomorphism of
"T onto "T' k must be a one to one function from Hj. ontoHT; b(i) can be express-
ed by:
(') if [(to) = f'(tO)' then k(f) (to) = k(f')(tO)'
(b-ii) adds two conditions:
(2) gf t e:: GK, 0
(3) gf t E: GK, f(to)'
Thus, if B,C ~"T' then B - C if and only if (i) and (ii), or (i) and (iii) are
satisfied, where
(i) B(f,tO)-KOC(f,tO)
(ii) For every J.. e:: KO' we have B(t..) -Kt..C(:f..), where B(:f..)
f(tO) = t.J.
(iii) For every t.. E: KO' B(t..) -Kll.'
The compoundmeasure u is defined by
lJ(B) = f lJ(B(t.))dlJ .
B(f, to) 0
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As an instance of this last example, as surre that KO = {t,1 ,t.2,'!.:3} where ;(.i
represents the choosing of urn i (i.e. there are three urns 1,2,3). In urn i
there are n. balls with m. white balls. K~. represents the choosing of a ball1 1 ~l
from urn i. The event "a white ball is chosen" is represent.ed by t.he set of
outcomes f, where f(O) 0:: KO and f(l) 0:: Kf(O) is a model where a white ball is
selected. Let us call this event \II.Suppose that IJO(L1) = IJO(f.z) = IJO(1.3) . Then
IJ(W) = f IJL·(W(~)) dlJOK 1o
1
= (1Ji...1(W(~))+lJt2(1V(i..z))+IJL3(\II(L3)))·3
4. PROBABILITY AS A LOGICAL RELATION.
The justification of the Connecting Principle is given via the conception
of probability as partial truth that was developed in Chuaqui 1977 and 1980.
This is a logical conception of probability. We, thus, need a language £.
A probability model J = <K,8,IJ> is appropriate for' l if the following t.wo
conditions are satisfied:
(i) The similarity type of the structures in K is t.he same as t.hat.of l.
(ii) B includes the set {NbciK(¢): ¢ a sentence of l}, where MociK(¢) =
{!0:: K :t... 1= ¢}.
If J is an appropriate probabilit.y model for t, we define, as in the ear-
lier paper'j,
IJ(M°ciK(¢)),
for all sentences ¢ of .e.
P provides a logical interpretation of probability as a relat.ion bet.ween
a sentence and a probabilit.y structure J, which is considered as an int.erpre-
tat ion of the sentence. PJ(¢) represent s a measure of t.he "degree of partial
truth of ¢ under the interpretation J". Notice that J has a dual role. On one
hand, it is a model of reality. On the other hand, it serves as an int.erpre-
tation of the language. The usual relat.ional structures (or possible models)
of logic can also be seen in this dual role. But. in this lat.t.ercase, reality
is completely specified and, hence, every sentence is eit.her true or false.
Th is logical interpretation of probability can serve to just i fy the Con-
necting Principle, which is now reformulated as follows:
Let Cx be any reasonable "degree of belief" funct.ion of a person who ac-
cepts the proposition X that the probability structure J is an adequat.e des-
cription of the situation involved, and that PJ(¢) = r', for a certain
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l' e:: [0,1]. Then
CxC<PJ = 4'_
The person p should believe <f> to the degree PJ(<f», because. l-jebelieves <f> to
be true to this degree. Thus, the connection between factual probabi li ty am' de-
gree of belief is obtained via t ru th. This is very natural because we be-
lievewhat we believe to be true. Thus, we should believe <f> with degree a when
we believe <f> to be true with degree a. This is similar to the relation between
usual logic and belief. If somebodybelieves <f> and that <f> logically implies 1/J
then he should believe 1/J.
Degrees of belief should be applied to propositions instead of sentences.
Thus, a more accurate description should involve Intensional Logic (s uch as
that of Reinhardt 1980).
Notice that I put Cx(<f» and not C(¢lx). This is so, because I believe the
acceptance of J does not change C by conditionalization (see Kyburg 1980 and
Chuaqui 1980, Section 2).
My main differences with Bayesians (at least with strict Bayesians) are two.
In the first place, I do not believe that probabilities (or degrees of belief)
can be assigned to all events. On Iy given a well-defined situation in which the
possible outcomes are determined, it maybe possible to assign probabilities.
In the second place, as it was mentioned before, I do not believe that the only
changes in the probability (or degree of belief) function proceed by condi t ion-
alization. The discussion of these matters would take l~ too far, so they will
be left for another paper.
5. A NOTE ON THE NUNCIPLE OF INSUFFICIENT REASON.
As an example of the '8ipplication of the ideas given previously, I shall
analyse the Principle of Insufficient Reason or Principle of Indi j ferenoe :
"The Principle of Indifference asserts that if there is no known reason for
predicating of our subj ect one rather than another of several altemati ves,
then relatively to such knowledge the assertions of each of these altemati ves
have an equal probability" (version of Keynes 1921, p.42).
This principle maybe interpreted in two different ways: cogniti ve and fac-
tual. Wecan say that the equal probability is established when one knows of
no reason or when the1'e a1'e in fact no reasons.The Principle as stated by Key-
nes (and also as stated by J. Bemoulli and Laplace) gives the first interpre-
tation. In this form, it is indeed contradictory, as the well-known paradoxes
show. However, a factual interpretation is also possible and maynot be contra-
dictory. fn fact, a careful reading of Laplace 1820, leads me to believe that
his intention was factual, although the actual wording is clearly cogniti ve.
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I believe that my synnnetry relation for events in probability structures is
such a factual interpretation. In order to illustrate these ideas I shall give
an analysis of Bertrand's paradox (Bertrand '889). It is nore convenient to in-
troduce first the notion of random variable. Let H be the s~t of outcomes of a
probability structure (simple or compound). Then a function X: H.+ R (R the set
of real munbers) is a random variable if and only if X-, * A e::: B (the algebra
of events) for every Borel set A soR.
The experiment for Bertrand's paradox is the choosing of a chord at random
in a circle and determining the probability distribution of the lengths of the
chords. If the experirnent is not further specified, we would have a simple prob-
ability structure (K,<A» where A is the set of chords and K contains all mod-
eIs of the form <A ,8> where 8 consists of one element of A (the chord selected).
Wedefine the random variable X: K + R by X«A,8» = the length of the chord
in 8. The a-algebra of events B should be {X-'*A: A Borel, As R}. GK is the
set of all permutations of A that transform B into B. In a sense, they are a
counte rpar t of Borelian funct i.ons on R. It is not difficult to prove that there
is no measure invariant under GX-
So we should specify the experirnent further. In fact, the origin 0 f Ber-
trand's paradox arises from the fact that we can specify this experirnent in sev-
eral different ways which yield different distributions. Each of these ways can
be put into the framework of my probability structures. I shall indicate how
this can be done for two of these specifications.
(a) Choose two points on the ci rele and draw the chord between them. Wehave
a compolUldprobability structure with a causal structure consisting of the sub-
trees of the tree <{to,t,}, = >, i.e. T = {to,t,} consists of two independet'
eIenent s , Let K = <K,a> where K consists of all structures:tv = <C,r,O> with C
the points in the circle, r rotations, and 0 the selected point; a = <c>. The
experiment in question is rodeled by Kwith the random variable X: TX+ R
where X (f) the distance between the point selected at f(tO) and that selected-,*at f(t]); B = {x (A): A a Borel subset of R}. The group GXcorresponds to
the rotations of the circle. Thus, there is an invariant rneasure.
(b) Select first a point on the circle and then a point on the radius
through the fi rst point. The chord chosen is the perpendicular to the radius
through the second point. Weare again in front of a compoundprobability struc-
ture consisting of the subtrees of <T'~T> where T = {to,t,} has two elements
and to ~Tt,. At to we have the sarneK as in (a). For each to e::: K we have K =
<Kto'C> where Kto is the set of structures of the form <D,t,I>, D contains the
points on the radius passing through the point 0, t the translations of the
line modulus the radius, and I the point selected on the radius; C = <D>. In
ss
order to complete the model we need a random vari.able Y: H .,.R, where H = {f:
Dof = {to,t1}, [(to) e:::Kand [(to) e:::Kf(to)J is the set of outcomes, and Y(t)
is the length of the chord perpendicular to the radius selected at f(tO) and
through the point selected at f(t1). The algebra of events is {y-
1*A: A a Borel
subset of R}.
ihe group of Kf..o is the group of translations; so again there is an invar-
iant measure. By the usual analysis (see, e.g. Parzen 1960) we can obtain the
distributions that are expected.
6. CLASSICAL AND BAYESIAN STATISTICAL INFERENCE REVISITED.
"fhe purpose of this section is to improve the analysis of classical and
Bayesian statistical inference given in Sections 3 and 4 of Chuaqui 1980, in the
light of the modifications introduced so far.
First, I shall analyze classical inference. Let us assume that we have an
experiment which can be repeated and we propose a simple probability modeI J =
«K,Ol>,B,j1> for it. This is now a factual model, so we can assume it as a sci-
entific hypothesis. Wethen repeat the experiment It times for a large It and ob-
tain a sequence of results. The probability of events consisting of sequences
of results is computed by bui l.di.ng the compoundprobability structure UX and
proceeding as in Chuaqui 1980. Recall that here we have a compoundprobability
structure, with causal structure F composed of the subtrees of <w, = >, l.e.
all moments in ware independent. Events are subsets of UX, the set of outcomes.
If a compoundevent A occurs which has a low probability according to "1< and
high according to another structure wK', then we reject the original hypothesis
that J = «K, Ol >,B, u> is the adequate simple probability model.
This account is the same as that of Chuaqui 1980, and can be completed as
there. What I would like to make precise is the type of simple probability
models J that can be taken as hypothetical models. Suppose, 'first, that the ex-
periment is that of tossing a coin. In this case, we have a complete physical
explanation of the phenomenonand the model J can be built accordingly. However,
there are many cases where the only known facts are frequencies observed in se-
quences of repeated experiments. Thus, the only natural J is one that just mim-
ics the choosing of elements of a set. Wehave to assume that there is an un-
knownphysical explanation for this way of choosing.
For instance, suppose that we observe that the relative frequency of the
event is about 1/3. Then we should assume a K with models of the fOTIn OlO=
<A,E,O> where A contains three elements, E (the event considered) .contains one
fixed element of A, and 0 (the chosen element) contains one element of A, dif-
ferent for each model. The intrisic part is <A ,E> and the structural part
<A,O>.
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If the relative frequency tends to /[/2, for instance, then our structures
in K should be like that of a symmetrical roulette <C,r,f,E,O>, with E a fixed
interval of length /[/2 and 0 the chosen element.
However, these types of models without any physical e~lanation are not com-
pletely satisfactory, because we do not know the mechanism for choosing O.
Thus, in a sense, the assumptions drP. not as well substantiated in the pure-
ly statistical case as when we have physical models. A case in point is the ob-
ser~ d relation between cigarette smoking and cancer. The evidence is almost
purely statistical, since there are no generally accepted physiological models
for this phenorrenon . I believe this is one of the reasons for the difficulties
in accepting this connection as proven. The statistical evidence had to be over-
whelming for the general public to accept that cigarrete smoking increases the
chances of getting cancer.
Something similar is true for Bayesian inference. Here we have the causal
tree <{to,t1} ~T> with to ~T t1, a simple probability model JO = «IC,OlO>'
80, lJO>' and for each ;L <= KO' another simple probability model J;[.; Wemay assume
as hypothesis any JO' The trouble here is that it is often the case that we
have no evidence for JO (JO determines what are usually called "a priori" prob-
abilities). Thus, these models might be less justified than the classical ones.
Also, we might have evidence for a simple probability structure that admits no
invar iant measure. In this case, Bayesian methods cannot be used. Only if we
haw good evidence for a JO that admits a probability measure, the method is
perfectly adequate.
Given such probability models as the JO's for the prior probabilities or
the J's based only on frequencies, it is one of the aims of science to replace
them by probability models based on physical laws.
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